By Raj M. Desai, Itzhak Goldberg
In recent times, the Russian executive, considering maintaining its monetary functionality, has sought to advertise extra assorted and broader fiscal progress past the ecocnomic natural-resource zone. monetary officers wish to see whatever in the direction of a "knowledge-based economy". one of many parts in transparent want of upgrading is the producing quarter. This e-book quantifies and benchmarks the relative strengths of that area, deciding upon possibilities to extend Russian productiveness and competitiveness.Drawing on unique survey info from Russian agencies of all sizes, the authors formulate proposals that goal to: improve the leading edge power of Russian agencies; improve the talents in their team; and boost a business-friendly weather of decrease administrative bills and bigger coverage sure bet. This e-book examines the underlying firm-level determinants of data absorption, competitiveness, and productiveness, with a watch to bettering staff' ability degrees and bettering the funding weather, which may still in flip increase the innovation had to sustain in a globalized economic climate. the unique examine and research of Desai, Goldberg, and their colleagues may be of use to someone attracted to the issues of establishing production competitiveness, specially in Russia and the post-Soviet transition economies. it is going to even be of curiosity to agencies planning on doing enterprise with Russia or to take a position in it.
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Additional resources for Can Russia Compete
The appreciation of the real exchange rate explains that result to some extent, but it also can be explained by the inability of Russian industries to provide enough competitive consumer and investment goods to meet growing internal demand. The situation is aggravated by the fact that, in markets for both consumer and investment goods, increases in revenues, incomes, and imported goods lead not only to higher demand but also to higher standards of quality. So although the current Russian trade balance looks extremely healthy, the trends are not favorable: export revenues depend exclusively on world market prices for natural resources, while import growth is a result of the Productivity 17 relatively low competitiveness of manufacturing and will probably continue independent of exports.
By 2004, average employment was 722 and 658, respectively. Job destruction also speeded up over time: net employment growth in job-destroying firms was −70 percent in 1991–95 and −80 percent in 2000–04. Declines and increases in employment depended strongly on the sector and industry. In the food industry, 58 percent of firms were job-creators, while in textiles only 8 percent were. In the rest of industry the share of job-creators varied less, from 14 percent in machinery to 23 percent in the wood industry.
Trying to compete internationally with cheap labor in other countries (not only China and India but also Brazil and South Africa) is not an option for 22 M ARK S CHAFFER AND B ORIS K UZNETSOV the Russian manufacturing sector. In Russia, sales per worker are $6,800, well below sales for India ($8,600), China ($10,900), and Brazil ($12,300). But at $2,600 per worker, labor costs are fairly high compared with those in India ($1,300) and China ($1,400). While labor costs in Russia are still lower than those in Brazil ($4,900), real wages in Russian industry have been growing at a rate in excess of 15 percent a year, and that relative competitive advantage will probably disappear in a few years.