By Kunne W.
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Extra info for Conceptions of Truth
Suppose you assert (A). If I were to react by (assertively) repeating (A), I would be open to the charge of parroting. I can easily avoid it by using (C). But no matter whether I use (A) or (C), Strawson contended, I am not talking about what you said. What then am I doing, over and above asserting what you asserted, in responding to your utterance by saying (C)? I am agreeing with, endorsing, underwriting what you said; and, unless you had said something, I couldn't perform these activities, though I could make the assertion you made.
Using the terminology of late medieval logicians, we might say that by Grover's lights 'true' is only a syncategorematic, or consignificative, component of 'that is true'. e.
It is worth completing for another reason as well: the continuation of [B] in that passage contains Frege's own example for propositionally unrevealing truth talk. [B]. . Und doch! ist es nicht ein großer Erfolg, wenn nach langem Schwanken und mühsamen Untersuchungen der Forscher schließlich sagen kann: 'was ich vermutet habe, ist wahr'? [. ] [C]Die Bedeutung des Wortes 'wahr' scheint ganz einzigartig zu sein. Sollten wir es hier mit etwas zu tun haben, was in dem sonst üblichen Sinne gar nicht Eigenschaft genannt werden kann?